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INTRODUCTION

“We are on the cusp of changing the legal relationship between
nonhuman animals and humans. The time is now to push even harder,
as hard as we can. And keep pushing until we win.”
Public concern for animals has dramatically increased in recent
years, particularly in the United States and other Western nations.
There has been a rise in the uptake of vegan diets and animal advocacy
in general. At the same time, human cruelty toward animals has
escalated. A burgeoning global population has led to increased food
requirements, while growing wealth in many countries has increased the
demand for animal food products. Animals used for food are subject
to cruel treatment daily. While the public interest in animal welfare is
yet to be fully embraced by the law, it does suggest that a significant
proportion of the public wishes to see an increase in the legal
protections granted to animals.
In terms of how to better protect animals, direction can be taken
from the animal advocacy movement (AAM). Following the publication
of Peter Singer’s seminal text Animal Liberation in 1975, the AAM
developed and flourished. Yet, there are significant differences in the
ideologies and types of activism that are accepted and practiced by the
wide range of individuals and organizations that make up the AAM.
Their views on human and animal relations are markedly divergent, as
are their views about the best methods to achieve their goals. However,
1
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1

NONHUMAN
RIGHTS
PROJECT,
https://www.nonhumanrights.org
[https://perma.cc/Z9X9-PANH].
2
Lindsay Oberst, Why the Global Rise in Vegan and Plant-Based Eating Isn’t A Fad
(600% Increase in U.S. Vegans + Other Astounding Stats), FOOD REVOLUTION
NETWORK (Jan. 18, 2018), https://foodrevolution.org/blog/vegan-statistics-global/
[https://perma.cc/JZ2V-8UHB].
3
Maarten Elferink & Florian Schierhorn, Global Demand for Food Is Rising. Can We
Meet It? HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/global-demand-forfood-is-rising-can-we-meet-it [https://perma.cc/8QT6-N9BB].
4
Availability and Changes in Consumption of Animal Products, WORLD HEALTH
ORG.,
https://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/3_foodconsumption/en/index4.html
[https://perma.cc/CBS9-2QS8].
5
Rachel Hosie, The Undercover Investigators Exposing Animal Abuse in Factory
Farms, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/animalabuse-factory-farms-undercover-investigators-pigs-chickens-cows-turkeys-mercy-foranimals-a7501816.html [https://perma.cc/8SE8-DTQD].
6
See David Snow & Robert Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant
Mobilization, in FROM STRUCTURE TO ACTION: COMPARING SOCIAL MOVEMENT
RESEARCH ACROSS CULTURES, 197–217 (Bert Klandermans et al. eds., 1988); David
Snow, Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 380−412 (David Snow et al. eds., 2004); Pamela
Oliver & Hank Johnston, What a Good Idea! Frames and Ideologies in Social
Movement Research, 5 MOBILIZATION: AN INT’L Q. 37, 37 (2000).
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there is still enough commonality amongst the various participants and
ideologies to identify one broad movement.
The chief ideological divide is between animal welfare and animal
rights. Put simply, animal welfare allows humans to continue using and
killing animals while ensuring some protection for animals. Animal
welfare is associated with “humane” animal products, such as free-range
eggs and organic milk. Animal rights theory provides a more
fundamental challenge to our current relationship with animals. The
ideology of animal rights contests the concept of animals existing for
humans to use and slaughter, regardless of how “humanely” or
otherwise this is done. It holds that humans should confer fundamental
rights to animals. Animal rights are closely tied to veganism, which
involves an individual commitment not to eat or otherwise consume
animal products as well as to avoid other instances of animal
exploitation, such as the use of animals for entertainment. Broadly,
animal activist ideologies often sit somewhere on the spectrum between
these two positions.
The animal welfare paradigm remains the dominant legal
approach to animal protection in most countries. In this respect,
numerous countries have enacted animal welfare legislation, which
seeks to regulate the ways in which humans interact with animals such
that animal suffering is reduced. For example, in the United States, the
Animal Welfare Act provides minimum acceptable standards for the
care and treatment of particular kinds of animals. The Act came into
operation in 1966 and is the primary piece of federal legislation in the
United States that regulates the ways humans treat animals. Similarly,
7
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Robert Garner, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161,
161 (2006); Tania Signal & Nicola Taylor, Attitudes to Animals in the Animal
Protection Community Compared to a Normative Community Sample, 14 SOC’Y &
ANIMALS 265, 266 (2006) [hereinafter Attitudes to Animals]; Nicola Taylor & Tania
Signal, Willingness to Pay: Australian Consumers and “On the Farm” Welfare, 12 J.
APPLIED ANIMAL WELFARE SCI. 345, 346 (2009) [hereinafter Willingness to Pay].
8
AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, ANIMAL WELFARE: WHAT IS IT?,
https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Reference/AnimalWelfare/Pages/what-is-animalwelfare.aspx [https://perma.cc/42J6-9VE5].
9
Cary Williams, The Framing of Animal Cruelty by Animal Advocacy Organizations
13−14 (2012) (unpublished Honors thesis, The Honors College, University of Maine).
10
Tara Ward, Suffering Under the Law: Could Human Rights Be Used to Protect the
Basic Interests of All Animals?, 1 AUSTL. ANIMAL PROTECTION L.J. 57, 57 (2008).
11
Id. at 57–58.
12
Animal Welfare Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–544, 80 Stat. 350 [hereinafter Animal
Welfare Act of 1966].
13
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. LIBRARY, Animal Welfare Act,
https://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/animal-welfare-act [https://perma.cc/LEU8-NN8N].
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Australia and New Zealand have animal welfare laws that cover a wide
range of animals used for different purposes.
In recent times, however, animal rights language has emerged in
some jurisdictions. In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project
lodged its first lawsuits on behalf of four chimpanzees held in captivity
in New York State, seeking recognition of the chimpanzees’ rights to
bodily liberty. While this case was ultimately unsuccessful, it did inspire
reflection by New York Court of Appeals Judge, Eugene M. Fahey, that
“the issue [of] whether a nonhuman animal has a fundamental right to
liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus is profound and farreaching” and will need to be addressed. In India, the High Court in
Uttarakhand has recognized animals as rights holders. Some countries,
including Bolivia and Ecuador, have introduced protections for animals
using the language of animal rights in their constitutions.
This article contends that the case has been persuasively made for
the attribution of rights to animals. Rights have the potential to lead to
significant gains for animals, whereas any advances within the welfare
framework will always be extremely limited. Yet, for some people, the
concept of rights for animals seems absurd. Accordingly, this article
argues that the focus of academic discussion should be on what rights
animals are entitled to, rather than whether animals require welfare
protections or rights. While there has been some academic commentary
on what rights might be attributed to animals, developing a coherent
and comprehensive framework for the attribution of rights will
demystify what constitutes a rights-based approach to animals. This
framework could also potentially remove some of the fear associated
with granting rights to the “other.”
This article will begin with an overview of the contemporary AAM,
as well as the ways in which animal welfare and rights ideologies are
14
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14

See DEBORAH CAO, ANIMAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA
(Rozelle, N.S.W ed., Thomson Reuters, 2010).

AND

NEW ZEALAND 96−97

15

A Former Animal "Actor," Partially Deaf from Past Physical Abuse, NONHUMAN
RIGHTS
PROJECT,
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/client-kiko/
[https://perma.cc/UF9S-6557]; The NhRP's First Client, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT,
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/client-tommy/ [https://perma.cc/3Q8V-ZMGM ];
Two Former Research Subjects and the First Nonhuman Animals to Have a Habeas
Corpus
Hearing,
NONHUMAN
RIGHTS
PROJECT,
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/hercules-leo/ [https://perma.cc/RF7J-F7X3].
16
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 100 N.E.3d 846, 849 (N.Y.
2018) (Fahey, J., concurring).
17
Narayan Dutt Bhatt v. Union of India and Others, Writ Petition (PIL) No. 43 of 2014,
99A (India) [hereinafter Narayan Dutt Bhatt].
18
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [CONSTITUTION] art. 33 (Bol.);
CONSTITUCIÓN DE ECUADOR DE 2008 [CONSTITUTION] arts. 71, 73 (Ecuador).
19
See, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R.
Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum eds., 2006); GARY L. FRANCIONE & ROBERT GARNER,
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE: ABOLITION OR REGULATION? (2010).
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represented in law. The article will then summarize the case for
granting legal rights to animals, with reference to human rights
literature. After this, attention will turn to the obstacles to granting rights
to animals and the merits of developing an animal rights framework.
There are related issues that lie beyond the scope of this article.
First, it is important to note that animal welfare and rights are not the
only theories that provide a framework in which to understand our
obligations to animals. Other perspectives include the feminist ethics of
care framework. While the focus of this article is animal rights and
welfare, the significance of other perspectives is acknowledged due to
their legal applicability and the particular importance of these theories
to the AAM. Further, entities other than animals are also excluded in
the discussion of legal rights; for example, insects and the environment.
The merits of different legal approaches to other excluded entities are
also beyond the scope of this article.
20
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24

II. AN IDEOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEMPORARY
ANIMAL ADVOCACY MOVEMENT***
Ideology is an important factor in motivating actors in social
movements generally, and in the AAM specifically. The need for many
activists to provide “intellectual justifications for their feelings,” and
perhaps a desire to be seen as being driven by a clear ideology rather
than more emotive concerns, has led to animal advocates looking to
philosophical writings on our relationship with animals to underpin their
goals and actions. These writers include Tom Regan and Gary
Francione, whose impact has been considerable, especially since the
widespread adoption of the Internet. In addition, Peter Singer’s
philosophy has been, and continues to be, particularly influential. Julian
25

26

27

20

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
22
See infra Part IV.
21

23

THE FEMINIST CARE TRADITION IN ANIMAL ETHICS 2–3 (Josephine Donovan &
Carol Adams eds., 2007).
24
Garner, supra note 7, at 161; Attitudes to Animals, supra note 7, at 266; Willingness
to Pay, supra note 7, at 346.
Editor’s Note: The following section is taken largely from Nick Pendergrast’s thesis.
25
Snow, supra note 6, at 383.
26
Julian Groves, Animal Rights and the Politics of Emotion: Folk Constructions of
Emotions in the Animal Rights Movement, in PASSIONATE POLITICS: EMOTIONS AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 212, 221 (Jeff Goodwin et al. eds., 2001); Nicola Taylor, Luddites
or Limits? The Attitude of Animal Rights Activists Towards Science, 3 J. FOR CRITICAL
ANIMAL STUD. 46, 46 (2005).
27
See, e.g., Groves, supra note 26 at 221; Roger Yates, The Social Construction of
Human Beings and Other Animals in Human-Nonhuman Relations. Welfarism and
Rights: A Contemporary Sociological Analysis (2004) (unpublished thesis, Bangor
University).
***
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Groves labels the philosophers of the AAM as the “high priests” of the
movement. Sociologist Bob Torres uses similar language to Groves in
his depiction of the role of Singer as the unquestionable “god,” or at
least “father” of the AAM.
28

29

A. Singer and Animal Welfare
James Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin’s comment that “philosophers
served as midwives of the animal rights movement in the late 1970s”
captures the significance attached to these writers. In this period, before
Regan and Francione’s work began to influence the movement, Singer’s
utilitarian philosophy was vital to the growth of the AAM, and a catalyst
for an increase in concern amongst the general public about animal
suffering. Singer’s text, Animal Liberation, was first published in 1975
and led to not only an “organizational explosion” in groups advocating
for animals but also assisted in the rise of the animal rights arm of the
AAM. Mark Pearson, Executive Director of Animal Liberation New
South Wales, emphasized the importance of Singer in “legitimising”
concern for animals:
Singer's work caused a big shock wave in faculties,
industries, companies, animal industries and beyond
because of his clear logic rather than the emotion and
anthropomorphism usually associated with animal rights
groups. Singer's work tore away the armoury that industries
usually used to dismiss the claims of animal rights activists
due to his rationality.
In his book, Singer drew on liberation sociology to understand that
through “othering,” dominant groups assume their interests are more
important than the interests of the oppressed group. This fundamental
dynamic is useful in understanding racism and sexism, as well as
30

31

32

33

28

Groves, supra note 26, at 222.
BOB TORRES, MAKING A KILLING: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 4,
111 (2007).
30
Siobhan O'Sullivan, Conflict and Coherence Within the Australian Animal Protection
Movement 3 (2006) (Conference Paper, Australasian Political Studies Association
Conference).
31
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?, in THE ANIMALS READER: THE
ESSENTIAL CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS (Linda Kalof and Amy Fitzgerald
eds., 2007).
32
DIANE L. BEERS, FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY: THE HISTORY AND LEGACY OF
ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2006).
33
Interview with Mark Pearson, Executive Director, Animal Liberation New South
Wales in The University of Melbourne (2011) [Reproduced in: A Sociological
Examination of the Contemporary Animal Advocacy Movement] [hereinafter Interview
with Mark Pearson].
29
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“speciesism”—that is, discrimination based on species. Animals are
sentient (conscious and able to experience suffering and pleasure),
meaning that they have interests (for example, an interest in avoiding
suffering). Yet, due to speciesism, their interests are denied simply
because of their species. Singer’s notion of animal liberation and
discussion of speciesism were strong influences in the more widespread
adoption of an animal rights ideology that challenged human-imposed
hierarchies.
These views challenged long-held values related to the animal
welfare ideology, which was, and remains, focused on limiting the harm
caused by the lower place in the hierarchy of living beings ascribed to
animals. The focus is on working for better treatment of animals used
for human ends. Animal welfarists oppose acts of cruelty towards
animals, but not what they view as the humane use of animals, such as
for food and clothing. While there had been individuals advocating for
vegetarianism and against vivisection (experimentation on live animals)
since the 1800s, a more radical movement with a significant animal
rights component did not exist before the 1970s. Most animal advocacy
organizations were traditional animal welfare organizations such as the
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA).
Welfarists not only accept human supremacy over all animals but
also uphold hierarchies amongst animals: while all animals deserve
ethical consideration, some are more deserving than others. For
example, “the family companion animal, [welfarists] contend,
unquestionably earns a higher place on the pyramid than a cow or pig.”
Elizabeth Cherry explains that in Western culture, cats and dogs are
seen as “symbolically unfit for consumption,” in contrast to other
animals socially constructed as “food animals.” Welfarists do not
challenge these social constructions.
In this respect, Singer’s rejection of speciesism and the serious
consideration he gives to a wide range of species places his position
closer to that of animal rights theorists such as Regan than the traditional
34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

34

D. Wicks, Humans, Food, and Other Animals: The Vegetarian Option, in A
SOCIOLOGY OF FOOD & NUTRITION 269 (John Germov & Lauren Williams eds., 2004);
Interview with Peter Singer, at The Univ. of Melbourne (2012) [hereinafter Interview
with Peter Singer].
35
Wicks, supra note 34, at 269.
36
BEERS, supra note 32, at 3–4; Interview with Peter Singer, supra note 34.
37
BEERS, supra note 32, at 3.
38
Lyle Munro, The Animal Rights Movement in Theory and Practice: A Review of the
Sociological Literature, 6 SOC. COMPASS 166, 170 (2012); Interview with Peter Singer,
supra note 34.
39
BEERS, supra note 32, at 3; Munro, supra note 38, at 170.
40
BEERS, supra note 32, at 3.
41
Elizabeth Cherry, Shifting Symbolic Boundaries: Cultural Strategies of the Animal
Rights Movement, 25 SOC. F. 450, 458 (2010).
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animal welfare approach. Although Singer has played a vital role in the
move towards animal rights in the broader AAM and, as noted above,
has often been labelled as the “father of the animal rights movement,”
he explicitly rejects a rights-based approach. Singer’s philosophy of
“animal liberation” can be viewed as a “middle ground” approach,
between animal welfare and animal rights.
This shows that these ideologies should be viewed as a continuum
rather than a binary, with many views falling somewhere in between the
two. Many animal advocacy organizations and individual animal
advocates cannot be labelled as purely promoting animal welfare or
animal rights, as they promote a mixture of both. For example, People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals believe in animal rights as their
ideal “end goal,” reflected in their slogan “animals are not ours.”
However, the organization engages in animal welfare campaigns
alongside their animal rights campaigns in order to achieve short-term,
pragmatic gains. This is why some theorists refer to various “clusters”
in the movement, acknowledging a wide variety of “goals, tactics, and
philosophical positions.” Siobhan O’Sullivan provides a critical
analysis of these various clusters.
Singer explains that he is “far from those who take a rights-based
approach philosophically.” He acknowledges that there is “more than
a verbal difference” between the approaches; in fact, the philosophical
differences are “fundamental.” These differences are also likely to have
“practical implications.” Singer uses the term “‘animal rights’ [as a]
shorthand reference [for the] way in which the needs and desires of
animals [create] moral obligations on our part.” His association with
42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

42

Interview with Peter Singer, supra note 34.
D. Bourke, The Use and Misuse of “Rights Talk” by the Animal Rights Movement,
in ANIMAL LAW IN AUSTRALASIA: A NEW DIALOGUE 136 (Peter Sankoff & Steven
White eds., 2009); Munro, supra note 38, at 171; Singer, supra note 31, at 15.
44
Munro, supra note 38, at 173.
45
Interview with Mark Pearson, supra note 33; O'Sullivan, supra note 30, at 3; Protecting
Animals 33: Glenys Oogjes from Animals Australia, KNOWING ANIMALS (Apr. 15,
2019),
https://knowinganimals.libsyn.com/protecting-animals-33-glenys-oogjes-fromanimals-australia [https://perma.cc/U6Q7-HN25].
46
Ingrid Newkirk, A Pragmatic Fight for Animal Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2010/jan/21/peta-animal-rightscampaign [https://perma.cc/PP9K-FCG9].
47
See, e.g., GARY FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 36−40 (1996); JAMES M. JASPER & DOROTHY NELKIN,
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS CRUSADE: THE GROWTH OF A MORAL PROTEST (1992).
48
JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 47, at 8; O'Sullivan, supra note 30, at 3.
49
O'Sullivan, supra note 30, at 22−24.
50
Interview with Peter Singer, supra note 34.
43

51

Id.

52

Singer, supra note 31, at 3.

53

Id.
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the term “animal rights” at the same time as philosophically rejecting a
rights-based position illustrates the widespread confusion over the term
“animal rights.”
Singer’s utilitarianist beliefs contribute to his rejection of a rightsbased position. It is the “rights” aspect of “animal rights” rather than the
“animal” aspect to which Singer objects. He contends that to say human
beings have rights just because of their species is an example of
speciesism and that if humans do have rights, then so should animals.
He rejects human rights and rights in general. Singer maintains that
rights are not the only way to raise the status of animals. Instead, he
proposes that we focus on animals’ interests and other considerations,
such as animals’ preferences and their experiences of pleasure or pain.
The focus on interests is consistent with a utilitarian approach,
although other philosophical approaches also use the concept of
interests. Utilitarianism focuses on the result of one’s actions.
Utilitarians use the universal “greatest happiness principle” to judge
actions, with actions considered right if they produce happiness (defined
as pleasure and the absence of pain) and wrong if they produce the
opposite of happiness (defined as pain and taking away pleasure).
Singer contends that animal interests “should be given the same
consideration as the like interests of any other being.” Singer’s critique
of speciesism means that his approach to animals is different than the
traditional animal welfare perspective, which contains “an in-built
assumption that human interests are almost always more important than
those of animals.” Giving animals equal consideration in these cases
would not allow practices “based on treating animals as things to be used
for our advantage, without any thought being given to the interests of the
animals themselves.” The phrase “without any thought being given to
the interests of the animals themselves” is critical. It clearly differentiates
Singer from animal rights-based theorists. Singer’s utilitarian viewpoint
would not necessarily protect animals from uses such as
experimentation but would require weighing the animals’ suffering
against the benefits humans might realize from such experimentation.
54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

54
55
56

FRANCIONE, supra note 47, at 2; Bourke, supra note 43, at 136, 143.
Singer, supra note 31, at 3.

Id.

57

Charles Taylor, The Diversity of Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 129, 131
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
58
John S. Mill, Utilitarianism, in PHILOSOPHY: THE BIG QUESTIONS 386 (Ruth Sample
et al. eds., 2004).
59
Singer, supra note 31, at 3.
60
Interview with Peter Singer, supra note 34.
61
Bourke, supra note 43, at 133.
62
Singer, supra note 31, at 3.
63

Id.
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The idea of animal welfare came about with the realization that
animals’ physical and emotional well-being is important, not just their
productivity for human ends. Cary Williams explains that “[b]oth
animal rights and animal welfare advocates agree that animals should be
protected, and that animals are sentient creatures.” These ideologies,
however, vary greatly in the protection that should be granted to animals
as a result of their sentience. According to the animal welfare approach,
when humans use animals for their own ends, they have a duty to
provide the following five freedoms for animals: “to be free from thirst
or hunger; to have adequate shelter; to be kept free from pain, injury
and disease; to be permitted to express normal behaviours (by providing
sufficient space); and to be free from fear or distress.”
Despite the widespread acceptance of the idea of animal welfare in
attitudes and legislation, these freedoms are not necessarily guaranteed
for animals, who continue to be routinely crowded, confined, and
harmed. The animal welfare approach, which opposes “unnecessary”
suffering to the animals used by humans, assumes that animal pain and
suffering can be acceptable, as long as humans believe the pain and
suffering caused is “reasonable” or “necessary.” Even when the five
freedoms are ensured, animal welfare ideology gives animal lives no
inherent value and accepts their slaughter and use, while facilitating and
regulating the process.
Singer’s utilitarian weighing of interests is primarily focused on
pleasure and pain, much like the animal welfare perspective. Robert
Nozick, however, criticizes utilitarianism as being too focused on
experiences of pleasure and happiness while ignoring other
considerations. Singer’s views are also questioned by Francione, who
objects to Singer’s position on “replaceability.” Singer explains that
“replaceability refers to the argument that one could defend raising
animals in good conditions and kill them based on the fact that other
animals could replace them.” Singer rejected the concept of
replaceability in the first edition of Animal Liberation in 1975.
However, in the second edition of this book, published in 1990, he
explained that this rejection was not sound. Singer is now somewhat
64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

64

Bourke, supra note 43, at 132.
Williams, supra note 9, at 12.
66
Bourke, supra note 43, at 132.
67
Aysel Dogan, A Defense of Animal Rights, 24 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 473, 473
(2011); Ward, supra note 10, at 57.
68
Taylor, supra note 26, at 47; Attitudes to Animals, supra note 7, at 266; Bourke, supra
note 43, at 133.
69
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 42−45 (1974).
70
GARY FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG?
141 (2000).
71
Interview with Peter Singer, supra note 34.
65
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undecided on the concept but is more inclined to accept it than he once
was.
Singer’s position that animal suffering is important but continued
life for animals is not is similar to traditional animal welfarists such as
John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham (who were also utilitarians).
Bentham’s famous quote about animals says, “[t]he question is not can
they reason? Nor, can they talk? But can they suffer?” However,
Bentham, like Mill and Singer, did not see killing an animal as imposing
harm in and of itself. According to Francione, the utilitarian focus on
pleasure and pain leads Singer to overlook animals’ interest in the
continuation of their lives. To account for all animal interests, rightsbased theorists such as Francione and Regan argue that both
utilitarianism and animal welfare are inadequate.
72
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B.

Regan, Francione, and Animal Rights

Regan applies fundamental moral rights to all sentient beings,
regardless of intelligence or rationality. These sentient beings include
vulnerable humans, such as infants and severely mentally disabled
people, as well as all animals. According to rights-based theories, the
rights of the individual trump the collective interest. In the moral game,
the rights card is the “trump card.”
In the context of animal rights, Regan believes that animals should
have certain moral rights, such as the right to bodily integrity and the
right not to suffer. These rights place limits on what humans can do to
animals, with individual rights trumping any benefits that come about to
others as a result of violating their rights. For example, unlike Singer’s
utilitarian perspective, Regan’s rights theory would protect animals from
being forced organ donors and being subjects in medical experiments,
regardless of the benefits to humans.
Francione’s rights-based theories share many similarities with
Regan’s but also some differences. Regan, as a philosopher, focused on
moral rights but argued legal rights are an entirely separate matter.
Francione is a lawyer focused on legal rights for animals. Under the law,
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persons are largely distinct from property, and animals are categorized
as property. However, it is important to note that humans are afforded
more limited property rights toward wild animals. Property comprises
a “bundle of rights” that can be exercised by the property owner in
relation to property, such as the rights to possess, to use, and so forth.
The problems created by the legal status of animals as the property
of humans have been a “constant theme” of Francione’s work.
Francione argues that instrumentalism, which is the view of animals as
means to humans’ ends, is only possible due to the property status of
animals, as “to be property means precisely to be means to an end
exclusively.” This instrumentalism is central to the exploitation of
animals, as exploitation is defined as “making use of and benefiting from
resources” and “making use of a situation to gain unfair advantage for
oneself.” For Francione, it is the use of animals as property, for profit,
and other selfish reasons, such as enjoyment, which is central to the
problem of our current relationship with animals. These human
interests are placed above the fundamental interests of their animal
property, such as avoidance of suffering and continuation of life.
The egg and dairy industries are relevant illustrations of these
processes in action. In these industries, males are generally killed within
a few days of birth because they cannot produce the desired product.
Similarly, females are slaughtered once they are no longer producing
enough eggs or dairy to be profitable. There is no desire to keep
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animals alive, feed them food and water, provide them with space, and
attend to their other needs when they are no longer profitable to their
property owners.
The property status of animals is the basis for Francione’s critique
of animal welfare. Lisa Chalk, spokesperson for the RSPCA, explains
that animal welfare is based on the idea of balancing the interests of the
industries using animals and the interests of the animals themselves.
Francione argues that it is not possible to meaningfully balance the
interests of animals and the industries that use them. This balance is
meant to occur between property and the property owner, but the
property owner always wins. As a result, despite animal welfare
regulations designed to provide animals with some protection, “animals
are largely unprotected from harm, so long as an overriding human
interest can be identified.”
Francione believes that industries using animals only improve the
treatment of animals when such gains are in their economic interests.
As animals are property, there will not be any gains in their treatment
for their own sake, but only coincidentally. For example, there is a
widely held belief amongst companies producing animal products, and
even some animal advocates, that minimizing stress (especially prior to
slaughter) and generally better treatment of animals leads to higher
quality meat. Another example from the poultry industry is provided
by some companies moving to controlled-atmosphere killing (gassing)
of chickens. This practice is touted as a welfare gain in comparison with
other methods of slaughter, such as slitting animals’ throats or
maceration (blending them alive), although some experts debate this is
a gain, as the RSPCA argues that maceration is more humane than
gassing. Francione contends that this change to the slaughter method
has been implemented because it is a more efficient way to kill chickens,
rather than out of concern for the chickens themselves. Economically,
there are benefits to the industry, including reducing worker injuries.
To sum up the point Francione is making, while animals are property
under the law, improvements in their treatment will be negligible and
are only initiated to make their exploitation and slaughter more efficient
or profitable.
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In terms of practical differences between animal rights and animal
welfare, animal rightists are abolitionists seeking to abolish animal
exploitation rather than merely regulating it. They consider that
exploiting and killing animals for human ends is wrong in principle,
rather than occasionally wrong in practice. Therefore, it is “not larger
cages, but empty cages that animal rightists call for.” As Francione
states, the problem with our current relationship with animals from an
animal rights perspective is that we kill and use animals, in contrast to
the animal welfare perspective, which is concerned with “how we treat
them and how we kill them.”
While Francione and Regan’s theories, taken together, provide a
useful summation of the animal rights perspective, there are differences
in their approaches that go beyond Francione’s focus on legal rights and
Regan’s focus on moral rights. One of these differences is more
philosophical. When discussing the hypothetical situation of dogs and
humans on a lifeboat that cannot support everyone, Regan contends that
death is a much more significant harm for humans than animals. As a
result, he argues that a dog should be sacrificed before humans, and
even that one million dogs should be sacrificed to save one human, as
the loss of human life is so much more significant. In contrast,
Francione defends the idea of the “moral equality of human and
nonhuman life.” This view goes against the consensus, even amongst
“pro-animal” philosophers, “that human life is more valuable than
animal life.” There are also other differences with more practical
implications for activism.
Regan and Francione’s views diverge markedly when it comes to
the types of animal rights campaigns they advocate. Regan favors
“winnable abolitionist campaigns” that focus on unpopular uses of
animals, with the aim of abolishing these practices (rather than
campaigning for better treatment generally). He cites examples such as
animals performing in circuses, greyhound racing, seal slaughter,
whaling, animals in product testing, and the fur industry. In contrast,
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Francione sees single-issue campaigns focused on just one form of
animal exploitation, rather than campaigning against all animal
exploitation, as inconsistent with the aim of furthering progress towards
the abolition of all animal exploitation. He maintains that single-issue
campaigns “almost always reinforce the notion that certain forms of
animal exploitation are better than others.” For example, he asserts
that a campaign that opposes animals being killed for their fur, while not
mentioning leather or wool, implies that fur is ethically a “worse”
product.
Just as the property status of animals is central to Francione’s
analysis of the current problems with our relationship with animals, the
concept also underpins his solution. Francione believes that all sentient
beings deserve not to be considered the property of someone else, so
animals need just one right, which is “the right not to be treated as the
property of humans.” According to Francione, if this right is extended
to animals, they will become moral persons. This means that they will
be considered beings with morally significant interests, rather than
things.
In order to achieve the legal personhood of animals, Francione
believes the focus of the AAM should be on “vegan education” (the
promotion of veganism) as the main tactic to incrementally move
towards the goal of the abolition of animal exploitation. He explains
that “ethical veganism is a profound moral and political commitment to
[the] abolition [of animal exploitation] on the individual level and
extends not only to matters of food but also to the wearing or using of
animal products.” Ethical veganism, beyond just diet, is a rejection of
the idea of animals as mere resources for human use and a recognition
of their intrinsic moral value. Francione believes that this “rejection of
the commodity status of nonhuman animals” through veganism leads
towards the legal personhood of animals and the abolition of their
exploitation. He sees this as being achieved through reducing the
demand for animal products immediately and building a long-term
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movement objecting to the use of animals as “things” or property, which
can lead to meaningful prohibitions on animal use in the future.
119

C.

Parallels to Human Rights in the Literature on Animal Rights

Clear parallels exist between human rights and animal rights
advocacy, which are illustrated in literature on animal rights. Regan and
Francione often draw on examples from human rights to build their
cases for animal rights rather than welfarist or utilitarian positions. One
striking example from Regan was the Nazis’ use of human prisoners for
hypothermia research. Without rights as a trump card, a utilitarian must
weigh what was learned through research and how the results would
protect others against the suffering of these prisoners. To the rights
theorist, such benefits are very much beside the point and do not justify
this research, as the individual’s right to bodily integrity has been
violated.
Regan also draws on human rights examples to reject welfarist
animal advocacy. He explains that death penalty abolitionists—who
believe that capital punishment is inherently wrong in principle rather
than just sometimes immoral in practice—call for the complete abolition
of the practice, rather than attempting to reform it to make it more
“humane.” He draws not only on these human rights debates about
the death penalty, but also other debates such as human slavery or child
labor to compare them to the animal rights and animal welfare debate.
He sees differences but also some commonalities in the issues and the
logic used in opposing these practices. He argues for the abolition of the
exploitation of animals rather than attempting to make it more
“humane.” Regan urges animal rights activists to take up this call just as
human rights advocates call for the abolition of the death penalty.
Similar arguments have also been made by others, such as Torres and
Francione.
Francione draws on human rights to clarify his position on animal
rights, explaining that his concept of animal rights does not mean giving
animals the same rights as humans, since many human rights (such as
the right to vote or free speech) have no application to animals. Indeed,
as Regan notes, some of these rights also have no application to
vulnerable humans, such as infants and severely mentally disabled
people.
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With the property status of animals as a central theme of
Francione’s work, he draws on institutionalized slavery in the United
States to establish some lessons for animal advocates today. Francione
explains that in the case of human slavery—where certain groups of
people were classified as merely property rather than persons—there was
some attempt to create a third legal category for slaves as “quasipersons,” or “things plus.” He argues that this did not work because
this alternative category did not grant these individuals the right to have
equal consideration given to their interests. Therefore, they were still at
risk of being treated as non-person “things.” Francione explains that
there are only two kinds of beings recognized in the moral universe—
persons and things—and that for the rights of animals to be taken
seriously, they also need to be granted legal personhood.
This overview of the contemporary AAM shows that there are
significant ideological differences between animal welfare and animal
rights positions. While advocates from each school seek to improve the
status of animals, animal welfare advocates do not seek to end the use
and exploitation of animals by humans, whereas animal rights advocates
do. As was noted earlier, these positions cannot always be viewed as
binary, as many advocates promote a mixture of rights and welfare, and
some promote welfare in the short-term despite a long-term desire for
animal rights. The next section of this article will consider the extent to
which the law reflects animal welfare and animal rights ideologies.
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III. ANIMAL WELFARE AND ANIMAL RIGHTS IN THE LAW
While the ideological overview provided above discusses animal
welfare and animal rights positions both in moral and legal terms, this
section of the article is focused solely on the manifestation of ideological
positions in the law. For the remainder of the article, animal welfare laws
refer to those laws that seek to improve the situation of animals, without
attributing legal rights to them. For example, laws might require larger
cages for battery hens or that sheep be protected from extreme
temperatures when being exported by ship. Welfare laws like these do
not give animals rights or impose duties on the animals in question. In
contrast, animal rights laws refer to those laws that grant animals
fundamental rights, which can be claimed through a guardianship
arrangement, declared in and enforced through the law. In this respect,
the following definition from Francione and Anna Charlton is useful:
We use the term ‘animal rights’ in a different way, similar to
the way that ‘human rights’ is used when the fundamental
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interests of our own species are concerned. For example, if
we say that a human has a right to her life, we mean that her
fundamental interest in continuing to live will be protected
even if using her as a non-consenting organ donor would
result in saving the lives of 10 other humans. A right is a way
of protecting an interest; it protects interests irrespective of
consequences. The protection is not absolute; it may be
forfeited under certain circumstances. But the protection
cannot be abrogated for consequential reasons alone.
131

A. Animal Welfare Laws
Currently, there is no international agreement relating to animal
welfare. Nevertheless, past decades have seen multiple efforts aimed
at achieving some international recognition and protection for animal
welfare. Although it was never adopted, in 1988, the International
Convention for the Protection of Animals was drafted seeking to
establish standards for the treatment of animals. Subsequently, the
World Society for the Protection of Animals commenced a process
intended to create an international agreement relating to animal
welfare. The Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare was drafted
and has been subject to amendments in 2003 and 2005. Yet to date, it
has not been adopted by the United Nations. There has been more
success in the adoption of animal protection agreements in the regional
sphere. For example, animal welfare is recognized in the Treaty of
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Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community. Article 13 of the Treaty
provides that member states will “pay full regard to the welfare
requirements of animals.” Article 13 also recognizes animal
sentience.
Animal welfare ideology is, however, prominently reflected in
national laws. Most states in the United States have enacted legislation
seeking to recognize, protect, and improve the life circumstances of
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some or all animals. In 1641, the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay
Colony Code was passed, making the United States the first country in
the world to enact laws to protect animals from cruelty. At the federal
level in the United States today, the Animal Welfare Act of 1966
provides minimum acceptable standards for the care and treatment of
particular kinds of animals (excluding rats, mice, and livestock) and is
implemented by the United States Department of Agriculture.
Further, all fifty states have some form of anti-cruelty legislation in place,
although there is variability in the scope of protections afforded and
numerous exclusions. Similarly, in Australia, all states and territories
have passed legislation that seeks to protect animal welfare. In New
Zealand, the Animal Welfare Act 1999 is directed towards safeguarding
animal welfare.
Many countries have also included animal welfare statements in
their constitutions. For example, under the Federal Constitution of the
Swiss Confederation, Switzerland is required to legislate on animal
protection. In India, the Constitution of India 1950 confers a duty on
every citizen of India to “have compassion for living creatures.”
Similarly, in Brazil, the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil
requires the government to “protect the fauna and the flora, with
prohibition . . . of all practices which represent a risk to their ecological
function, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty.”
While there is a proliferation of animal welfare laws around the
world, animals continue to suffer in countless and often unthinkable
ways as a result of human action. There are a number of reasons for
this. One reason that animals continue to suffer is the legislative
exceptions, defenses, and qualifications that are frequently included in
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animal welfare legislation. For example, in Australia, many Acts
contain provisions that enable compliance with industry practice or a
code of practice to operate as a defense to an animal cruelty charge. In
other words, so long as there is compliance with common industry
practice or a code of practice, prosecutions for animal cruelty will be
unsuccessful. Further, animal cruelty legislation often excludes
particular species. For example, in the United States, the protections
provided by the Animal Welfare Act of 1966 do not extend to animals
raised for food or the majority of animals used for research. These
exceptions mostly limit cruelty prosecutions to isolated individual acts
of harm to animals, rather than institutionalized suffering through
animal industries. Even where animals are covered by legislative welfare
protections, there can be a lack of enforcement of those protections.
In order for a law to be effective, it must be monitored and enforced.
Therefore, violations of the law require consequences, but this is often
not the case for animal welfare legislation.
A common feature of animal welfare legislation is that it
discriminates between different species of animals. In particular, a
distinction is often made between companion and non-companion
animals and between wild and non-wild animals. Many jurisdictions
also have special laws for assistance animals, animals used in
entertainment, livestock, non-native species often referred to as “pests,”
and animals used in research. The discrimination evident in many
animal welfare laws is fundamentally based on the nature of the
relationship between each species and humans. Thus, companion
animals—those that are most valued by humans—enjoy higher levels of
welfare protection than farm animals. The welfare protection that is
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afforded to animals, therefore, is based on the perceived value of the
animal to humans, and in this sense is speciesist. This aligns with
animal welfare ideology in that animals are a means to an end, rather
than having value in and of themselves.
157

B.

Animal Rights Laws

Although the animal rights ideology is not commonly reflected in
the law, in recent times, animal rights language has been invoked in the
legal context. For example, article 33 of the Constitution of Bolivia
confers the “right to a healthy, protected, and balanced environment”
of “other living things.” Similarly, articles 71 and 73 of the Constitution
of the Republic of Ecuador recognize the rights of Mother Earth and
provide for the protection of species. In terms of legislation, the
Norwegian Animal Welfare Act 2010 provides that “[a]nimals have an
intrinsic value which is irrespective of the usable value they may have
for man.” Some significant advances in the attribution of animal rights
are detailed below.
158

1.

Recognition of Animal Rights in the United States: The
Nonhuman Rights Project

One of the most prominent examples of the emergence of animal
rights in the law is the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP), founded by
lawyer Steven Wise in the United States. The NhRP seeks to secure the
legal recognition of rights for animals. In order to achieve this goal, the
NhRP initiates litigation by filing writs of habeas corpus on behalf of
animals held in captivity, advocating recognition of legal personhood,
and in some cases, the right to bodily integrity. To date, the litigants
include the great apes Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo; the elephants
Beulah, Karen, Minnie, and Happy; as well as dolphins and whales.
The NhRP has also set up legal working groups in England, Spain,
France, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Portugal, Argentina, Israel,
Turkey, India, and Australia “to develop nonhuman rights campaigns
suited to the respective legal systems” of those countries. The NhRP
also seeks to work with local governments to develop legislation that
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recognizes animal rights and raises awareness of the significance and
legal basis for animal rights through education.
The NhRP has experienced significant successes through its
efforts. In the case of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley, Justice
Barbara Jaffe of the New York County Supreme Court ordered the
Respondents to show cause as to why an order should not be made for
the release and transfer to an animal sanctuary of the chimpanzees
Hercules and Leo, who were being used as research subjects. This order
made Hercules and Leo the first nonhumans in history to be granted a
habeas corpus hearing to determine whether their imprisonment was
lawful. Further, in her 2015 ruling, Justice Jaffe determined that
persons (such as the NhRP) have standing to bring cases on behalf of
animals without alleging any injury to human interests. This constituted
a significant achievement because standing is a fundamental
precondition necessary to receive any protection from the law.
Subsequently, in proceedings brought on behalf of the elephant named
Happy, the Honorable Tracey A. Bannister of the Orleans County
Supreme Court issued an order to show cause to determine the legality
of Happy’s imprisonment at the Bronx Zoo. This made Happy the
first elephant to be granted a habeas corpus hearing, as well as the
second time in the United States that an animal had been granted such
a hearing.
In separate proceedings on behalf of the chimpanzee, Tommy,
Judge Eugene M. Fahey of the New York Court of Appeals expressed
views that were sympathetic to the attribution of rights to some animals.
He stated that “[t]he issue whether a nonhuman animal has a
fundamental right to liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus is
profound and far-reaching. It speaks to our relationship with all the life
around us. Ultimately, we will not be able to ignore it.” While Judge
Fahey’s comments are not legally binding, they do speak to a willingness
on the part of at least some members of the legal community to engage
in a discussion regarding the potential attribution of rights to animals.
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Recognition of Animal Rights in Argentina

The NhRP has also had a significant impact outside of the United
States. In 2016 in Argentina, as a result of litigation modelled on that of
the NhRP, Judge María Alejandra Mauricio ruled that a captive
chimpanzee named Cecilia was a “non-human legal person” and had
“inherent rights.” This made Cecilia the first animal in the world to
gain legal personhood and have legally recognized rights. Judge
Mendoza explained in her judgment that the ruling recognized and
affirmed that primates are nonhuman legal persons that have
fundamental rights “that should be studied and listed by state
authorities, a task that exceeds the jurisdictional scope.” Further, she
stated:
This is not about granting [animals] the same rights humans
have, it is about accepting and understanding once and for
all that they are living sentient beings, with legal personhood
and that among other rights; they are assisted by the
fundamental right to be born, to live, grow and die in the
proper environment for their species.
This was a very significant ruling that potentially sets a precedent
for animal rights gains for other animals in Argentina and beyond.
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3.

Recognition of Animal Rights in Switzerland

Recently, Swiss courts have also begun to talk about animal rights.
In a decision handed down on January 15, 2019, the Cantonal
Constitutional Court ruled that an initiative that aims to grant primates
constitutional rights to life and bodily and mental integrity was valid and
is required to be submitted to people in Basel-Stadt for a vote. While
the decision is subject to appeal, if the vote proceeds it will constitute
the first democratic vote on whether animals should have rights.
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Recognition of Animal Rights in India

Courts in India seem to be prepared to recognize rights for
animals. In Animal Welfare Board of India v. Nagaraja, the supreme
court considered whether events relating to “Jallikattu” and bullock-cart
races conducted in the states of Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra were
violations of provisions of The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act,
No. 59 of 1960 (PCA Act), read with provisions of the Constitution of
India. The court stated that the imposition of obligations on persons
having charge of animals in the PCA Act “confer[red] corresponding
rights on animals.” It indicated that “[a]ll living creatures have inherent
dignity and a right to live peacefully,” and have the right to have their
well-being protected. It also noted that while there remains no
international agreement relating to the protection of animals, there has
been an observable trend towards greater recognition of nature—
including animal—rights. Consequently, “every species has an inherent
right to live and shall be protected by law, subject to the exception
provided out of necessity. Animal [sic] has also honour and dignity
which cannot be arbitrarily deprived of and its rights and privacy have
to be respected and protected from unlawful attacks.”
Additionally, the court in Nagaraja indicated that rights granted to
animals under the PCA Act must be read in conjunction with articles
51A(g)–(h) of the Constitution of India, which provides:
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51A. Fundamental Duties.
It shall be the duty of every citizen of India ─
….
(g)
to protect and improve the natural environment
including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have
compassion for living creatures;
(h)
to develop the scientific temper, humanism and
the spirit of inquiry and reform….
Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides protection for
“life,” and the court indicated that life includes animal life and “means
something more than mere survival or existence or instrumental value
for human-beings, but to lead a life with some intrinsic worth, honor,
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and dignity.” Further, the rights protected under sections 3 and 11 of
the PCA Act include the right to live in a healthy and clean atmosphere,
to be protected from humans against the infliction of unnecessary pain
or suffering, to food and shelter, and to dignity and fair treatment.
Moreover, the “five freedoms” found in chapter 7.1.2 of the guidelines
of the World Organisation for Animal Health are to be read into
sections 3 and 11 of the PCA Act:
(i)
freedom from hunger, thirst and malnutrition;
(ii)
freedom from fear and distress;
(iii)
freedom from physical and thermal discomfort;
(iv)
freedom from pain, injury and disease; and
(v) freedom to express normal patterns of behaviour.
While these five freedoms were discussed above as welfare rather
than rights protections, Indian law has gone well beyond traditional
welfare protections and has started to transition toward rights for
animals. The case of Narayan Dutt Bhatt concerned the treatment of
horses that were being used to transport loads over the border of India
and Nepal. Allegations were made that the conditions experienced by
the horses were cruel in that the loads were very heavy, the horses lacked
adequate shelter and, in some circumstances, were abandoned. The
parties agreed to broaden the scope of the issues to be decided by the
court, as it was considered in the public interest to do so. In particular,
the court considered the question of whether legal personhood might
be extended to animals, with legal personality generally being a
prerequisite for the attribution of rights.
In the course of its judgment in Narayan Dutt Bhatt, the court
emphasized that the concept of legal personhood is a legal fiction. In
other words, it is up to humans to decide what does and does not count
under the law, and legal personality is the way in which law makes
something count. The court identified that there is precedent for a
“gradual extension” of legal personality to all human beings, as various
groups, including children and people with disabilities, did not enjoy
such rights in the past. While the attribution of rights to animals may
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seem fanciful, it is likely that the extension of rights to new groups always
appears fanciful before it occurs. Further, legal personality has been
granted to nonhuman entities in the past, including corporations and
deities. Where legal persons, such as children, are not able to exercise
their legal rights, the law operates to empower another person to
exercise those rights on their behalf. Thus, having considered the
relevant authorities, the court held that animals, birds, and fish are all
legal persons with equal rights to human beings, and that all human
beings have standing to seek the enforcement of animal rights:
The entire animal kingdom including avian and aquatic are
declared as legal entities having a distinct persona with
corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person.
All the citizens throughout the State of Uttarakhand are
hereby declared persons in loco parentis as the human face
for the welfare/protection of animals.
The “corresponding rights” approach taken by the court includes
three basic ideas. First, it involves attributing legal personality to animals.
This means that, like human persons and corporations, animals are legal
people capable of suing and being sued, owning property, and entering
into contracts. Second, it requires legal recognition of animal rights,
which will correspond to those capable of being held by humans. Given
that fundamental human rights are recognized in law, animals should
also be entitled to the enjoyment of fundamental rights. Finally, humans
are empowered to act as legal representatives for the rights, duties, and
liabilities of animals.
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IV. WHY THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS IS MORE PERSUASIVE
THAN THE CASE FOR INCREASED WELFARE PROTECTIONS
The debate regarding whether animals should be granted
increased welfare protections or attributed rights has continued for
several decades. This section of the article looks at the reasons why
animal rights arguments are more compelling than those for increased
animal welfare protections. In this respect, it considers the failure of
animal welfare laws to adequately protect animals’ interests. It then
proceeds to look at the importance of legal rights when compared with
legislative welfare protections and the principles that might inform a
rights-based approach to animals by reference to the experience of
human rights.
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A. Failure of Animal Welfare Laws
Most countries have enacted laws that seek to protect the welfare
of animals. For example, as identified earlier in this article, the United
States was the first country to pass laws designed to protect animals from
cruelty and negligence. In contemporary United States laws, the
federal Animal Welfare Act provides for the care of some warmblooded animals. Further, the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
1958 aims to protect cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, and swine from
being slaughtered in an inhumane manner. At the state level, all fifty
states have enacted anti-cruelty legislation, although the scope and
content of the legislation varies significantly between jurisdictions.
Despite the commonality of animal welfare laws, animals not only
continue to be treated cruelly by humans, but the extent to which
humans exploit them has grown. In the context of the agricultural use
of animals, the emergence of factory farming methods of production has
resulted in an increased use of cruel practices, including de-beaking,
branding, cropping, and castration, as well as increased confinement
and removal of natural light for animals. Similarly, in sports, animals,
including horses and greyhounds, are increasingly subjected to
overbreeding, poor conditions, and massacres. Even wildlife is not
spared; each year, millions of animals are killed as “pests,” including
rabbits, deer, and squirrels.
There are many reasons that animal welfare laws have failed to
prevent cruelty to animals. One reason is that many practices that are
cruel to animals actually remain within the law, as a result of common
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exclusions from anti-cruelty legislation. For example, animals used for
agriculture are often excluded from the scope of anti-cruelty
legislation. Another issue is the enforcement of anti-cruelty legislation,
which is frequently delegated to underfunded charitable organizations.
However, while it could be argued that improvements to animal welfare
laws might resolve these problems, they would still fail to address the
fundamental problem with animal welfare laws. At its heart, such laws
always relegate consideration of animal interests below consideration of
any rights or interests of humans. For example, while animal welfare
legislation might prohibit causing animals “unnecessary” suffering,
suffering may be considered “necessary” where the practices that cause
it would reduce the costs involved with the production of animals for
food. This suffering could also be considered necessary where such
practices may contribute to scientific research outcomes, or even
where they contribute to human entertainment.
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B.

Importance of Rights

Academic literature related to the importance of rights is helpful in
understanding how welfare standards have been insufficient to protect
animals. Rights are of particular significance in the context of animal
issues and provide an important tool for advocacy. One of the key
reasons for granting rights is to protect marginalized and persecuted
groups. In this respect, the international legal human rights regime
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stemmed from a desire to prevent the kinds of atrocities perpetrated by
the Nazi regime on Jewish, gypsy, disabled, and homosexual
populations, among others. The attribution of rights to people
belonging to marginalized and persecuted groups enables more effective
advocacy on their behalf. Advocates are able to argue for improved
conditions or better treatment on the basis that rights-holders are
entitled to such things. Where legal processes are ineffective to enforce
rights, the processes of “investigation, reporting and advocacy” enable
advocates to pressure governments. Further, drawing on a rights
discourse assists advocates to shape public morality and thus further
contribute to political pressure on governments. In contrast, advocates
arguing for improved welfare conditions are positioned to request such
improvements, because there is no entitlement. Whether
improvements are made, then, depends on the benevolence of the
relevant decision-makers.
The attribution of legal rights also legitimizes the claims made by
rights-holders and their advocates. Laws provide an agreed set of rules
through which conduct is regulated. When the law grants rights, it
validates claims based on those rights. While a similar argument may be
presented in relation to welfare laws, rights provide a stronger claim. For
example, legislation may provide that people are prohibited from killing
an animal, or it may provide that animals have a right to life. The culling
of rabbits as “pests” would, on its face, breach the prohibition on killing
the rabbits but also deny the rabbits their right to life. It is a stronger
position to claim a violation of the right than failure to adhere to the
welfare standard because the focus is on the entitlement of the rabbits
to their lives rather than on the conduct of people.
Recognition of fundamental rights also provides a framework
through which legislation can be analyzed and potentially amended to
better respect rights. In the context of human rights, the United
Kingdom, and both Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory in
Australia, have enacted human rights legislation. These Acts require
courts to interpret legislation, as far as it is possible to do so, in a way
that is compatible with human rights. They also require written
statements to be prepared in relation to proposed legislation which
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outline the extent to which that legislation is compatible with human
rights. Thus, they require parliaments to consciously consider whether
proposed legislation might infringe human rights before it is passed. If
similar legislation were introduced in relation to animal rights, there
would likely be greater legislative recognition and protection of animal
rights.
Further, as alluded to above in the rabbit culling example, rights
are important in that they shift the focus to the rights holder rather than
the conduct of people involved in rights violations. This is important
because it allows human rights holders to feel that their rights are
recognized and taken seriously, and that their experience of having their
rights violated is given primacy. In the context of the mass violation of
human rights during the Holocaust, for example, use of a rights-based
approach enables a focus on the experience of those who suffered at
that time, rather than the experience of the perpetrators. In the context
of animals, animal welfare laws tend to concentrate on the conduct of
the person alleged to have infringed the law, in that “the value of animal
life takes on a solely human orientated assessment.” The experience
of the affected animals tends to be of little importance. While refocusing
attention on the experience of the harmed animals may not be of
relevance to the animals themselves, it does communicate to humans
that animals hold intrinsic value.
One further strength of rights is that they recognize the agency of
those to whom they are attributed. In other words, rights-holders are
recognized as having legitimate interests and are empowered to make
decisions in relation to matters that concern them. This characteristic
of agency may appear to be an obstacle to the attribution of rights to
animals as it may be difficult to imagine animals having the autonomy
to make their own decisions. However, in his book, Fear of the Animal
Planet: The Hidden History of Animal Resistance, historian Jason
Hribal thoroughly debunks the notion of animals lacking agency,
documenting countless examples of animals resisting oppression. In
addition, as in the case of infants and the severely disabled, animals to
whom rights are attributed would be able to exercise agency through a
legal guardian. In contrast, legislative welfare protections for animals do
not permit the exercise of agency. Rather, these protections seek to
regulate the relationships between people and animals, just as the law
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regulates the relationship between people and other forms of property.
As lawyer Steven White explains, the “current legal construction of
domestic animals” within an animal welfare framework is “as objects of
absolute ownership” rather than “guardianship.”
231

C.

Principles that Inform Rights-Based Approaches

An additional reason why the case for animal rights is more
compelling than the case for increased animal welfare protection is the
utility of the principles that generally inform rights-based approaches.
Particular principles characterize a human rights-based approach.
While there is no single human rights-based approach, there are
principles that inform all such approaches which may be relevant to
animal issues, and that are centered on the attribution of rights. These
principles include recognition of dignity, accountability, and
participation. If animal rights were recognized, these principles
potentially hold great benefits for animals.
One of the key principles underpinning a human rights-based
approach is that of dignity. While the concept of dignity can be
“indeterminate” and “complex,” it broadly refers to some inherent
value possessed by human beings, which should be respected by
others. The major human rights documents refer to dignity as the
foundation of human rights laws. Thus, according to Freeman, “[t]o
accord rights is to respect dignity.” When considering the potential
attribution of rights to animals, it is worth considering the applicability
of the concept of dignity; if dignity is the foundation of human rights,
perhaps it might also function as the foundation of animal rights.
Analysis of the meaning of dignity indicates that it is not necessarily
specific to humans and may extend to (or beyond) animals. Further,
using the term “dignity” in relation to animals would send a message that
animals do have intrinsic value and should not continue to be viewed as
tools for human use.
Another fundamental principle of a human rights-based approach
is accountability. While in the context of humans, a welfare approach
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involves the provision of discretionary benefits as a result of government
policy, a human rights-based approach places obligations on the
government to ensure people’s rights are enjoyed. Thus, people are
entitled to the enjoyment of their rights and are able, through a variety
of enforcement mechanisms, to hold governments accountable when
they fail to fulfill these obligations. One of the key benefits of a rightsbased approach to the legal regulation of animals, therefore, is the
change in perception that should follow. Rather than positioning
animals to rely on the goodwill and intentions of the government,
animals (and their human guardians) would be able to claim rights as
their entitlement. This would strengthen advocacy efforts in the shortterm and should also lead to positive cultural change in the longer term.
Participation is another characteristic of a human rights-based
approach. Where people enjoy rights, they are entitled to participate
in decisions that may impact them. Students, for example, should be
involved in decisions concerning pedagogy, as this will impact their
enjoyment of the right to education. Participation is important because
what particular rights-holders need should not be assumed. As a result
of the rights-holders’ participation, decisions should better meet the
needs of the rights-holder. If animals were granted rights, then they
should also be able to participate in decisions that affect them. While
direct participation would not be possible, legal guardians could
participate on behalf of animals.
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D. Obstacles to the Attribution of Rights to Animals
Despite the failure of welfare protections to safeguard the interests
of animals, and the merits of a rights-based approach to animal issues,
there are still people that consider the concept of animal rights absurd.
This section of the article examines the obstacles to the recognition of
animal rights. It begins by looking at the allegation that granting animals
rights would be absurd, as well as the possibility that rights language itself
is clouding the potential benefits of recognizing animal rights. It also
looks at some obstacles that were overcome in the context of human
rights and how those obstacles may be overcome in granting animal
rights, including that animals are currently treated as property in the law,
that animals lack the capacity to exercise rights, and that recognition of
animal rights may conflict with human rights.
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The “Absurdness” of Animal Rights

The concept of animal rights is frequently described as absurd. In
general, animal rights critics contend that human beings are significantly
different from all other animals and that they should, therefore, be
uniquely entitled to legal rights. In particular, human attributes,
including the ability to make rational choices and exercise autonomy,
have been identified as being critical to enable a bearer of legal rights to
exercise those rights. Given that animals do not have these attributes,
some argue that they cannot be granted legal rights. On occasion, critics
also point to the absurdity of granting particular human rights to animals,
including the right to vote or the right to work.
Many arguments have been advanced to counter these claims. In
particular, following the argument from marginal cases, denying rights
to animals on the basis that they lack attributes such as rationality or
autonomy means that rights should also be denied to human beings who
lack such attributes. In other words, the reasoning behind denying
animals rights should also compel us to deny rights to severely mentally
handicapped human beings and very young children. Such an outcome
is unlikely to be accepted by the general public.
245

2.

Rights Language Itself as a Barrier

Rights language itself may act as a barrier to the acceptance of the
concept of animal rights. Reference to rights in contemporary society
has become a common means to advance human claims to protection.
In this respect, Sumner asserts that “there is virtually no area of public
controversy in which rights are not to be found on at least one side of
the question—and generally on both.” Yet the general understanding
of human rights—and thus rights more broadly—has developed in the
context of human conflicts. For example, international laws that
enshrine human rights were enacted against the background of atrocities
committed against human beings during World War II. The concept
of rights has become intimately connected with human beings, and the
idea of extending rights to nonhuman animals may seem nonsensical to
some people.
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To determine whether this is a legitimate criticism, reference needs
to be made to the definition of a right. While this may seem
straightforward, following Hohfeld’s work regarding rights, numerous
definitions of right have been put forward. For example, according to
Kamenka, “[r]ights are claims that have achieved a special kind of
endorsement or success” while Campbell asserts that “[t]he standard
view is that rights are moral entitlements.”251 Similarly, McCloskey
asserts that rights are simply entitlements252 and according to Feinberg,
rights are “valid claim[s].” Some definitions of rights do include an
aspect of humanness. For example, according to Kleinig, rights are
“those minimum conditions under which human beings can flourish
and . . . which ought to be secured for them.”254 Yet, such definitions
provide no reason for the exclusion of other beings from rights.
When considering the various definitions, two basic aspects of
rights commonly appear. First, rights are claims that can be made. In
other words, in asserting a right, the rights-holder is making some form
of a request. Second, there is validity to the claim. This validity can be
expressed using varying language such as “entitlement” or
“endorsement.” Considering rights as legitimate claims, it is clear that
there is nothing in the definition of a right that prevents rights from being
attributed to animals.
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250
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3.

Legal Status of Animals as Property

As previously identified, animals are generally treated as property
under the law, and property does not have rights. While this is the
case, it is not a true obstacle to the attribution of rights to animals as the
“body of entities that have been granted legal personhood has
continually expanded.” For example, laws have, in the past, generally
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treated children primarily as property. Indeed, the property status of
children continued up until the second half of the 20th century.
Attributing rights to children has been a very recent development.
Similarly, institutionalized slavery constituted “a system of property
ownership.” The law in these contexts operated as part of the problem
by marginalizing vulnerable groups and legitimizing the unethical
treatment of them. Changing the law to recognize especially vulnerable
groups—such as children and animals—as legal persons and rightsholders would reduce the likelihood that they will be exploited or
mistreated because they, or at least their guardians, will be empowered
to use the law in cases where their rights are violated.
258

259

260

261

4.

Capacity of Animals to Exercise Rights

Similarly, some claim that animals cannot be attributed rights
because they do not have the capacity to exercise rights or to recognize
and respect others’ rights. In particular, rights that are strongly
premised on human capacities, such as the right to vote, are pointed to
as highlighting the absurdity of recognizing animal rights. Further,
rights are said to place obligations or duties on others, and the inability
of animals to respect rights and fulfill rights-related duties is also used to
stand against the recognition of animal rights.
The capacity argument has also been made in the case against
recognition of children’s rights. Freeman states that “those who argue
against children’s rights . . . argue that children are just not qualified to
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have rights; they lack the capacity to do so.” The problem with the
capacity argument, however, is that holding rights “becomes exclusive
and exclusionary.” In other words, rights are only held by those
deemed to have capacity. Conversely, those who are deemed to lack
capacity, such as children or the mentally disabled, cannot hold rights
and their rights claims “need not be recognised.” Clearly, this result
runs counter to the purpose of human rights in the first place—to ensure
the respect and recognition of people’s equality and dignity. Further,
the capacity objection also suffers in that it “underestimates the
competencies that children, even young children, have.”
Where the capacity objection is raised against the recognition of
animal rights, the same answers outlined above may be made. Animals
should be recognized as having moral value and dignity. Denying them
rights also operates to deny them these, as to grant rights is to recognize
dignity. Further, animals do not lack capacity; they possess many
capacities, some of which are similar to those that humans possess, and
others that are not possessed by humans. Humans should be careful
not to underestimate the competencies of animals. Where animals lack
capacity to claim or exercise rights, they should be entitled, as children
are, to have legal guardians act on their behalf. In the case of nondomesticated or “wild” animals, an animal advocacy body could be
appointed as their guardian, similar to the case of the Whanganui River
in Aotearoa (New Zealand), which has been recognized as a living entity,
with its interests represented by the office of Te Pou Tupua. Further,
like children, animals should be “deemed incapable of committing an
offence.” Humans should not be relieved of their obligations to
recognize and respect the rights of others merely because animals are
incapable of exercising such restraint due to their nature. As Aysel
Dogan points out, humans have the ability to make moral choices and
thus “[w]e are morally obliged to observe the good of others whenever
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we are in a position to do so,” including in relation to the benefit of
animals.
278

5.

Conflict with People’s Interests

Another argument that is made against the attribution of animal
rights is that they might conflict with human rights and interests. It is
argued that a legal system that recognizes human rights is not able to
accommodate a concept of rights for animals. Further, others make
the case that to attempt to recognize both human rights and animal rights
would result in consequences that are either absurd or fearsome.
These same arguments have been made in relation to children’s
rights. The truth is that withholding rights from animals works in favor
of humans (as withholding rights from children worked in favor of
adults). However, like children, animals are particularly vulnerable
relative to adult humans. Freeman says of children’s rights:
There are good reasons why the interests of children should
rule . . . Children are especially vulnerable. They have fewer
resources – material, psychological, relational – upon which
to call in situations of adversity. They are usually blameless,
and certainly did not ask to come into the world. For too long
they have been regarded as objects of concern (sometimes,
worse, as objects), rather than as persons, and even to-day
they remain voiceless, even invisible, and it matters not that
the dispute is about them.
These same points may be made in relation to animals, perhaps
even to a greater degree. Animals have no entitlement to resources.
They are generally blameless and did not ask to come into the world,
let alone be exploited by humans. They have generally been regarded
by humans as “things” to be exploited for human needs and desires, and
only recently have become objects of concern, despite evidence of their
sentience and capacity for suffering. They are almost entirely voiceless,
and disputes about them tend to center on human interests, and
particularly economic concerns. Thus, animals need laws that will
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operate to protect them from human exploitation and cruelty. On
occasion, these protections might undermine human interests, just as
children’s rights sometimes undermine the interests of adults.

E.

The Benefits of Developing a Comprehensive and Coherent
Framework for Animal Rights and Some Suggestions in this
Respect

This section of the article explores the merits of developing a
comprehensive framework for the attribution of rights to animals.
While existing literature has begun to explore the question of what rights
might be granted to animals and the practicalities of how such rights
might operate, significant work remains to be done. Undertaking this
work would have immense value for a number of reasons. In particular,
shifting the scholarly discussion from the debate over rights versus
welfare to “fleshing out of the specific rights to which justice entitles
them” is likely to overcome some of the obstacles to animal rights
identified above. It would also complement efforts by the Nonhuman
Rights Project and similar bodies to secure legal rights for animals
through the courts. In terms of the initial steps toward the development
of an animal rights framework, some argue that in order to be
persuasive, a framework should be based on animal sentience, and
“must necessarily rely upon the pre-existing basic rights of human
animals.”
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1.

Animal Rights in the Literature

To date, scholarly discussion relating to the potential attribution of
rights to animals has primarily focused on whether animals require legal
rights or increased welfare protections. As Alex Bruce asserts, “[t]here
are essentially two schools of thought concerning the welfare of animals
in liberal democratic societies… ‘animal welfarism’ and ‘animal
rights.’” For example, in “The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or
Regulation?” Gary Francione and Robert Garner debate whether
animal use must be abolished through rights, or whether animal interests
can be protected within contemporary legal frameworks. Similar
commentary has included a perspective from renowned ethicist B. E.
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Rollin on animal rights versus welfare, and debates between Matthew
Scully and Wesley J. Smith on the topic. This focus on rights versus
welfare has been a reasonable approach to take, given that the welfare
paradigm remains the dominant approach to animal protection issues.
While the dominant focus in the literature has been on the welfare
versus rights debate, some attempts have been made to give substance
to a framework for animal rights that could underpin legal reform. Tom
Regan’s philosophical theory is one of the most prominent cases for
animal rights, yet he has argued that legal rights are a separate matter.
Gary Francione has argued that animals need only one right, the right
to not be the property of humans. Yet it would seem that in the case
of human beings, the right to not be the property of humans has been
insufficient, warranting the attribution of human rights. Accordingly, it
is likely that recognizing an animal’s right to not be the property of
humans would be insufficient on its own to protect animal interests.
Some theorists go further in identifying specific rights to be
attributed to animals. For example, James Rachels has argued that
research animals should be recognized as entitled to both the right to
not be tortured and the right to liberty. Martha Nussbaum asserts
that “all sentient beings, at least, have entitlements to the basic
conditions of a life according to the dignity of their species.” Her
capabilities approach provides some substance to the legal rights that
might be accorded to animals, including the right to life, to bodily health,
to bodily integrity, and so forth. Nevertheless, there remains a need to
develop and give substance to the specific rights that should be accorded
to animals, and the consequences of such recognition.
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2.

The Pivotal Role of the Law for Animals

As Nussbaum identifies, “[n]o major crimes against sentient beings
have been curbed by ethics alone, without the coercive force of law.”
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Thus, the law should be a key consideration for those seeking to ensure
the protection of animals from human cruelty and exploitation. In this
respect, law is important because it is “an important symbol of legitimacy
. . . an accomplished fact, which it is difficult to resist. And it change[s]
attitudes as well as behaviour.” Further, the law is critical because it is
what causes animals to be vulnerable to human cruelty in the first place.
Therefore, it is the only thing capable of protecting animals from
humans. This point is eloquently expressed by Korsgaard:
[I]t is not just because we are individually smarter than the
other animals that human beings are able to do as we will with
them. It is because human beings are so cooperative and
therefore so organized. And the way that we organize
ourselves is by making laws, which set the terms of our
interactions and so unite us into an effective whole. If the law
says it is permissible for a person to inflict torments on an
animal in order to test a product, for instance, then there is
nothing anyone can do to protect that animal. So it is one of
those cases ─ and there are certainly others ─ in which the
only thing that can afford protection against the power of the
law is the law itself.
Thus, the discussion in relation to animal rights needs to focus on
what legal changes are required to achieve justice for animals. In this
respect, it is important for the law to recognize animals as legal persons
because without such recognition, animals are mere property and not
able to hold rights. Further, in developing frameworks for animal
rights, the focus needs to be on the required legal reforms. Philosophical
theories will be helpful in this respect, but the means by which such
theories might translate into enforceable laws needs attention.
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3.

Demystification of the Animal Rights Concept

For some people, the concept of animal rights may be terrifying.
They may wonder, for example, whether their pets would be able to sue
them and whether animals would be able to roam the streets. One of
the benefits of developing a comprehensive and coherent framework
for the attribution of legal rights to animals is to remove some of this
fear. By setting out the theoretical basis for recognizing rights, and
identifying which specific rights should be attributed, and to which
animals, there is less opportunity for “what if” fears. Thus, giving
substance to the concept of legal rights for animals can help to overcome
some of the obstacles to the recognition of animal rights identified
above.
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Moreover, clearly identifying the common-sense legal rights that
should be attributed to animals is likely to be more persuasive than a
“rights are better than welfare protections” style claim. For example, it
may be proposed that all animals should be granted a right not to be
subject to torture. If so, it would be necessary to flesh out the content of
the legal right as applied to animals, identify the particular consequences
of its attribution, and discuss circumstances (if any) in which such a legal
right may be limited. While some people may object to some aspects of
the proposed animal right not to be subject to torture, it is likely that
most people would agree that animals should, in general, not be
tortured. Thus, clearly identifying the ways in which animals should not
be treated and the ways in which animals should be treated is likely to
persuade more people to support animal rights.
Further, developing a comprehensive and coherent account of
which rights should be accorded to animals before changes to the law
are made will help ensure the adequacy of animal rights laws. In
particular, some attention should be given to the theoretical basis that
should underlie animal rights laws, as well as the justification for their
enactment. Developing this comprehensive account of animal rights is
also likely to ensure consistency in the attribution of rights to animals
and anticipate any potential issues that might emerge if animal rights
laws are enacted. A detailed account of animal rights will assist countries
looking to enact such laws.

4.

Sentience as a Basis

The jury is no longer deliberating on whether animals are sentient;
it is widely accepted and scientifically established that they are. This
means that animals have the ability to feel or perceive things. Thus,
animals are able to feel pleasure and pain and likely have “some of the
[same] desires [as humans] . . . for food and water, shelter and
companionship, freedom of movement, and avoidance of pain.”
Animal sentience has formed the basis of many arguments for
concern for animals. As noted above, one of the seminal thinkers raising
the status of animals, Jeremy Bentham, famously stated in relation to
the question of who should be given moral consideration, that “[t]he
question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they
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suffer?”306 Similarly, Gary Francione’s argument for the recognition of
animal rights is based “only on animal sentience and no other cognitive
characteristic.” He argues that all sentient beings should have the right
to not be treated as the property of others.
Arguably, the sentience of human beings provides much of the
justification for the creation of international human rights laws. While
the concept of rights has a long history, it was only following World War
II that the documents comprising the International Bill of Rights were
signed and ratified. Thus, the creation of modern international human
rights law constitutes a direct response to the atrocities committed in
World War II. In this respect, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states that “disregard and contempt for human rights have
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of
mankind.” The acts committed in World War II, primarily against
Jews but also against gypsies and homosexuals amongst others, were
barbarous because human beings are sentient. If humans did not have
the capacity to feel pain or despair, such acts may have had little
consequence.
For these reasons, animal sentience should provide the basis and
justification for the development of a comprehensive animal rights
framework. This would align animal rights with human rights, and thus
give clarity to an animal rights legal framework for the broader
population.
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5.

Drawing on the Pre-Existing Basic Rights of Humans

As asserted by Steven Wise, the development of animal rights
should draw on the pre-existing rights of humans. In this respect,
human rights are granted in a number of ways. International human
rights are set out in the International Bill of Human Rights and
implemented in many domestic legal systems. Human rights are also
present in many countries’ constitutions and legislation. While some
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of these rights—such as the right to vote—would be inappropriate to
apply in relation to animals, others—such as the right to not be subject
to torture—may be relevant in the development of a framework for
animal rights.
A framework for animal rights should be developed using existing
human rights laws for a number of reasons. First, human rights are
commonly understood and accepted as a means to prevent the suffering
of human beings. If it is desirable to prevent the suffering of other
animals, it makes sense to apply a similar method to achieve that goal.
Second, laws relating to human rights have developed and established
frameworks for implementation and operation which may be beneficial
when developing an animal rights legal framework. Third, drawing on
established human rights laws acknowledges an aspect of equality
between humans and other species. That animals feel pain in the same
way that humans do is scientifically established, and acknowledging that
in the law would provide a reminder of the reasons for attributing rights
to animals.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent decades have seen an upsurge of interest in animal issues.
This interest has been propelled by advances in human understanding
of the extent to which animals are sentient and, in particular, the extent
to which animals can feel pain and suffer. Additionally, the increased
media attention of the mistreatment of animals, coupled with the
developments in technology that enhance the media’s reach have
increased the public’s interest in animal issues. In short, the public has
become more aware of the plight of animals. At the same time, driven
by the development and implementation of factory farming methods,
human cruelty to animals is at an historic high.
Given this context, there is a pressing need to discuss what further
legal protections animals require. Two ideological frameworks
dominate the discussion in this respect. The ideology of animal welfare
accepts the use and slaughter of animals as human property, as long as
certain protections are granted to the animals. Animal rights ideology,
on the other hand, seeks to end the legal categorization of animals as
property and grant them legal rights to protect their interests.
To date, most laws directed towards the regulation of the
relationship between humans and animals are representative of welfare
ideology. In other words, they seek to place limits on the actions of
humans so that the situation of animals is improved, but they do not
grant rights to the animals themselves. These laws are not particularly
effective. Animals continue to experience harm at the hands of humans
[https://perma.cc/64F8-VYNG]; International Norms and Standards Relating to
Disability, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/comp101.htm
[https://perma.cc/XPA3-TUYV].

200

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

on a massive scale. Granting legal personhood and rights to animals may
be more effective in improving the situation of animals. Some
jurisdictions, particularly in recent times, have been willing to entertain
a discussion of animal rights. While some of these laws are limited in
scope, using a rights-based framework has far greater potential to lead
to significant gains for animals than welfare laws.
There are compelling reasons why recognizing animal rights is
preferable to legislative welfare protections. Literature relating to human
rights suggests that fundamental legal rights carry significant benefits that
welfare laws do not provide. As Freeman states, “[t]he most
fundamental of rights is the right to possess rights,” and so far, animals
have been denied this right. Holders of rights are legal persons,
enabling them to sue and be sued, hold property, and enter into
contracts. Where welfare laws fail to provide sufficient protection for
animals, these benefits could prove critical in enabling animals to seek
protection from human harm through the law. They strengthen and
legitimize advocacy efforts, shift the perspective to the rights subject,
facilitate increased agency, and can be used as a framework to scrutinize
legislation. Similarly, the principles of dignity, accountability, and
participation inherent in all human rights-based approaches would be of
great service in the animal context. As the Uttarakhand High Court
observed in Narayan Dutt Bhatt:
The law's attitude towards animals could be said to amount
to a policy statement about human society's regard, or
disregard, for animals. Thus were the law to bring animals in
'out of the cold', where they languish as right-less beings, the
objects of rights held by legal persons, and draw them under
the umbrella of legal personality, it would ideally encourage
the development of more respectful and less exploitative
social attitudes towards animals.
This article has argued that it is time to shift the academic
discussion from the philosophical question of whether rights or welfare
protections are more desirable to a focus on setting out a legal
framework for animal rights. This shift should operate to dispel some
of the fear around attributing rights to animals and provide a reasoned
basis for countries to move in this direction. In this respect, it is asserted
that animal sentience should provide the basis for an animal rights
framework, and that animal rights should build on the pre-existing rights
of humans.
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